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With that sentence the Court indicated that the patients were
enjoying an indirect benefit and thus their "constitutionally
protected interest in life, liberty, or property" was not directly
affected. 339
In comparing federal decisions such as Barchi and O'Bannon to
state decisions like Augat, Sawnell, and Sedutto, there is
agreement, whether outright or implicit, on the issue of.
constitutional rights and how those rights are treated under cases
where license revocation is involved. The United States Supreme
Court and the New York courts are consistent in that both require
that one must have an interest, such as petitioner's job, at stake.
Once it is determined that an interest is at stake, the safeguards of
due process protect against the deprivation of that interest.
Situations exist where a state interest may supersede certain
procedural rights, as in Barchi. Furthermore, although rights may
appear to exist in certain situations, these rights may not exist, as
in O'Bannon, because they are misinterpreted. The Augat court,
perhaps fortunately, did not encounter such complexities. If it
had, surely Supreme Court precedents would have been applied.
Finally, the recognition of due process rights and one's liberty
interest in holding a license appears to be applied consistently, in
federal courts dealing with Medicare and gambling issues and in
New York courts when dealing with jockeys, boiler engineers,
and administrators. Of course, the general rules applied in Augat
are subject to exceptions based upon the specific language of the
statutory licensing provisions.
NEW YORK COUNTY
340
Campo-v. New York City Employees' Retirement System
(printed April 26, 1994)

The plaintiff, Mrs. Campo, brought her due process claim into
New York State court 341 following the dismissal 342 and
339. Id. at 790.
340. N.Y. L.J, Apr. 27, 1994, at 22 (Sup. CL New York County 1994).
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subsequent affirmation of her federal procedural due process
claim. 343 In state court, she again alleged, inter alia, that she had
been deprived of property, her husband's survivor benefits
without a hearing and, therefore, her due process rights had been
violated under article I, section 6, of the New York State
Constitution. 344 Similarly, her federal claim alleged the identical
violation under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.

345

In its decision on the cross motions for summary judgment
submitted by the parties, the state court granted the motion by the
defendant, New York City Employees' Retirement System
[hereinafter NYCERS], and dismissed plaintiffs motion 346 partly
on an analysis based on federal decisions. 347 Although the court
noted that the plaintiff's complaint was time barred under the
statute of limitations for bringing article 78348 hearings, 34 9 it
341. Id.
342. Campo v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 653 P. Supp.
895 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 (1988) [hereinafter referred
to as Campo 11.
343. Campo v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 843 F.2d 96
(2d Cir. 1988) [hereinafter referred to as Campo Ill.
344. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. The provision states in pertinent part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
345. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The provision states in pertinent part:
"No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law ...

346.
347.
348.
states:
The

."

Id.

Campo, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 27, 1994, at 22.
Id.
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 7803 (McKinney 1994). The provision
only questions that may be raised in a proceeding under this article

are:

1. whether the body or officer failed to perform a duty enjoined upon it
by law; or
2. whether the body or officer proceeded, is proceeding or is about to
proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction; or
3. whether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure,
was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or
an abuse of discretion, including abuse of discretion as to the
measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed ....
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considered, among other issues, 3 50 Mrs. Campo's due process
claim. The court stated that "[j]ust as the availability of article 78
relief satisfies the due process requirements under the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution (assuming that
plaintiff has a'protected property right).., so it satisfies the due
process requirements under the New York State Constitution." 351
The court then cited Economico v. Village of Pelham.3 52 The
court held that the defendant's "alleged failure to provide a
hearing [was] itself properly challenged in an article 78
proceeding." 3 53 Econonico, however, was abrogated by Prte v.
Hunt.354 In Economico, the court held that a police officer
claiming disability from a non-service related accident could be
dismissed from employment, pursuant to the Civil Service Law,
without a pre-termination hearing. 3 55 In opposition, the court in
356
Prue held to the contrary on the same issue.

Id.
349. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 217 (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1994). The
section provides:
1. Unless a shorter time is provided in the law authorizing the
proceeding, a proceeding against a body or officer must be commenced
withinfour months after the determination to be reviewed becomes final
and binding upon the petitioner or the person whom he represents in law
or in fact, or after the respondent's refusal, upon the demand of the
petitioner or the person whom he represents, to perfbrm its duty ....
Id. (emphasis added).
350. Canpo, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 27, 1994, at 22. The plaintiff, in addition to
her due process claim, also asserted a contractual claim. The court held that
plaintiff was not a third party beneficiary for purposes of breach of contract
and that no contractual relationship existed under which to bring her claim.
Id.
351. Id.
352. 50 N.Y.2d 120, 405 N.E.2d 694, 428 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1980).
353. Campo, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 27, 1994, at 22.
354. 78 N.Y.2d 364, 581 N.E.2d 1052, 575 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1991). In
Prue, the court stated that a police officer had a right to a hearing prior to
dismissal in addition to the post-termination procedures required by New York
Civil Service Law § 73. Id.
355. Economico, 50 N.Y.2d at 124, 405 N.E.2d at 696, 428 N.Y.S.2d at
215.
356. Prue, 78 N.Y.2d at 369, 581 N.E.2d at 1054, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
The Prue court relied on Cleveland Board of Education v. LoudermiI1, 470
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The plaintiff, Mrs. Campo, sought survivor's benefits from the
defendant, a city agency responsible for city employee pension
plans, 357 claiming she was due benefits from her deceased,
husband's retirement plan. 358 According to the defendant agency,
Mr. Campo, a former New York City Sanitation Department
employee, had opted, by default, for a pension plan that offered
higher lifetime benefits, but no survivor benefits. 359 Mrs. Campo
claimed, however, that her husband had returned a pension
application by certified mail specifying an option with lower
360
lifetime benefits which included survivor benefits.
Mr. Campo had received higher lifetime payments for three
years prior to his death in 1984.361 Thereafter, Mrs. Campo
visited the defendant's offices and was informed that her husband
had opted for the plan with no survivor benefits, by his default,
following the defendant's letter to him informing him of the
default option. 362 Mrs. Campo contended that her husband had
not received this letter and had in fact mailed back the
defendant's pension application specifying a plan with survivor
benefits. 363 However, the plaintiff was unable to produce the
receipt from this mailing.
Mrs. Campo then brought a procedural due process action.
under section 1983,364 in federal district court claiming that the
U.S. 532 (1984), which stands for the proposition that under due process, an
individual has the right to notice and a "pretermination" opportunity to
respond.
357. Campo, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 27, 1994, at 22.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.

362. Id. The court cited the defendant's rule on default in a footnote which
stated: NYCERS Rule 30(c) provides as follows:
A retiree shall be deemed retired under the retirement allowance without
optional modification (maximum) unless he or she elects an Option
within 60 days from the date of the letter setting forth the amounts
payable to him or her under the various Options or the option he or she
specifies.
Id. at 22 n.5.
363. Id.
364. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The statute provides:
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defendant violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
by depriving her of property rights in the pension plan survivor's
benefits. 365 The district court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss because, among other things, the availability of an article
78 hearing provided adequate due process, and this decision was
affirmed on appeal. 36 6 Mrs. Campo then brought suit in New
York State court arguing that the defendant violated her due
process rights. Thereafter, the defendant's motion for summary
67
judgment was granted. 3
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York concluded that an informal review of Mrs. Campo's
claim, by the defendant agency, and the availability of an article
78 proceeding, had provided her with constitutional due
process. 368 The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court decision
holding that Mrs. Campo was provided a due process hearing
through article 78 and that, as noted in the district court decision,
she could also bring a breach of contract claim against the
defendant in state court, which would satisfy procedural due
process. 3 69
However, the state court, while discussing Mrs. Campo's
constitutional claim, noted that the time limit for bringing an
article 78 claim had expired, and that Mrs. Campo's breach of
contract claim failed on its merits. 370
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory... subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or, other proper
proceeding for redress.
Id.
365. Campo 1, 653 F. Supp. at 897.
366. Campo 1, 843 F.2d.at 100.
367. Campo, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 27, 1994, at 22.

368. Campo HI, 843 F.2d at 99 (summarizing the district court's holding in
Campo 1).
369. Id. at 99, 102-03. The statute of limitations for breach of contract is
six years, pursuant to CPLR § 213. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 213
(McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1994).
370. Campo, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 27, 1994, at 22.
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Comparatively, the state court found no difference between
state and federal law on the issue of the plaintiff's procedural due
process right to a hearing and deferred to the federal analysis on
the matter. 3 7 1 Campo I, to which the state court referred,
detailed the Mathews v.

Eldridge3 7 2

"three-prong

test for

determining the constitutional sufficiency of administrative
procedures." 373 Campo II, which it also cited, pertained to
article 78 of New York Civil Procedure Law and Rules and the
Solnick v.

Whalen3 7 4 decision by the New York Court of

Appeals. In Solnick, the court held, among other things, that
article 78 proceedings are subject to a four-month statute of
limitations in which a party can institute a proceeding. 37 5
In Campo I, the district court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment. 37 6 In reaching its conclusion, the court
applied the Mathews three prong test, which requires a court to
consider the private interest affected by the action; the risk of
erroneous deprivation of that interest by the procedures to be
used, as well as the value of any substitute or additional
procedural safeguards; and the government's interest in the
substitute or additional procedural requirements, in terms of the
function involved and administrative and fiscal burdens. 37 7
371. Id. (citing Campo , 653 F. Supp. at 899-900 and Campo H1, 843 F.2d
at 101-02).
372. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (holding that individuals being deprived of
a property interest are entitled to a preliminary hearing of some form, and that
the availability of an administrative hearing satisfied due process requirements
for termination of disability benefits).
373. Campo I, 653 F. Supp. at 898-99.
374. 49 N.Y.2d 224, 401 N.E.2d 190, 425 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1980). Owneroperators of nursing homes claimed they had been deprived of due process
when the state sought to recover Medicaid overpayments on a retroactive basis.
The operators sought to enjoin the state's plan, however, the court held that an
article 78 hearing was the appropriate form of judicial proceeding for
reviewing the state's recovery plan, and that plaintiffs' complaint was thus
time barred by the four-month statute of limitations in which to bring an article
78 proceeding. Id. at 228, 401 N.E.2d at 193, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
375. Id. at 233, 401 N.E.2d at 196, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 73-74. The limitation
is imposed by N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 217.
376. Campo I, 653 F. Supp. at 900.
377. Id. at 899 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
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The district court noted that under the first prong, no "predeprivation" hearing was required because "survivor's benefits Ido not necessarily implicate 'the very means by which to
live.'" 378 Under the second prong, the court stated that not every
situation requires a "trial-type hearing" and that "the probable
value of such an administrative hearing is minimal since it [was]
unlikely to unearth information" that had not already been
received by the defendant for consideration. 37 9 Under the third
prong, the court balanced the plaintiff's interest in survivor
benefits against the defendant's burden of providing "an
administrative hearing to anyone challenging the terms of [the
defendant's] retirement option plan." 380 The court determined
that the defendant's burden was overwhelming since allowing
such hearings to any dissatisfied beneficiary might deplete the
3 81
government of moneys used to pay those benefits.
In holding for the defendant agency, the district court noted
that article 78 proceedings are available to claimants who
challenge administrative procedures. 382 The circuit court also
cited article 78 and Solnick, noting that such proceedings
afforded the appropriate avenue for the relief sought by Mrs.
Campo. 3 83 The plaintiff had argued that article 78 was an
inadequate remedy because she carried the burden of
"overcoming a presumption of administrative regularity." 3 84 She
claimed that since such a proceeding confined itself to the issue
of whether her denial of survivor's benefits was "arbitrary or
capricious," it failed to provide a means for assessing the strength
of her testimony. 3 85 However, the court stated that in an article
378. Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970)). Goldberg
holds that the termination of welfare benefits requires a pretermination hearing
because the effect of terminating welfare benefits immediately impacts an
ineligible recipient, and thus adversely affects that individual's means of
seeking redress.
379. Id. at 899.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Campo II, 843 F.2d at 101.
384. Id.
385. Id.
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78 proceeding, the court has authority to remand and order an
agency to conduct a proper hearing if the record before it
"demonstrates a[n] [arbitrary or capricious] lack of appropriate
procedure" by the defendant agency. 3 86
Citing Liotta v. Rent GuidelinesBoard3 87 the court noted that:
Plaintiffs cannot manufacture a [section] 1983 claim by pointing
to the allegedly defective meeting while ignoring that part of the
regulatory process that serves to redress administrative error.
Rather, in considering whether defendants have failed to afford
plaintiffs due process

. . .

the Court evaluates the entire

procedure, including the adequacy and availability of remedies
88
under state law. 3
In conclusion, the federal and New York State courts uniformly
hold that the availability of article 78 proceedings sufficiently
protect the property interests of individuals claiming pension plan
survivor's benefits, satisfying procedural due process
requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, and article I, section 6 of the New York State
Constitution. Following the above reasoning, the court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
New Amber Auto Service v. New York City Environmental
Control Board 389
(decided November 9, 1994)
Plaintiffs, New Amber Auto Service and Spin Holdings Inc.,
claimed that both an administrative code provision 390 and an
environmental control regulation, 3 91 which they were charged
386. Id.
387. 547 F. Supp. 800, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In Liotta, tenants sued the
defendant city's rent guidelines board to enjoin a rent increase that had been
decided during a meeting, described as so "unruly" as to deprive them of
property without due process. The court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment holding that the availability of Article 78 proceedings was
an appropriate remedy, which plaintiffs had failed to utilize timely. Id. at 80304.
388. Campo II, 843 F.2d at 102.
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